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2An Experimental Study On Real Options Strategies
Abstract
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether people in-
tuitively use real-option strategies in a dynamic investment setting.
The participants were asked to play as an oil manager and make pro-
duction decisions in response to a simulated mean-reverting oil price.
Using cluster analysis, participants can be classified into four groups,
which we label as “mean-reverting,” “Brownian motion real-option,”
“Brownian motion myopic real-option,” and “ambiguous.” We find
two behavioral biases in the strategies by our participants: ignoring
the mean-reverting process, and myopic behavior. Both lead to too
frequent switches when compared with the theoretical benchmark. We
also find that the last group behaved as if they have learned to incor-
porate the true underlying process into their decisions, and improved
their decisions during the later stage.
Keywords: Real Options, Experimental Economics, Heterogeneity.
JEL classification: C91, D84, G31
31 Introduction
In many capital budgeting scenarios, the managers have the possibility to
make strategic changes, such as postponement and abandonment, during the
lifetime of a project. A typical example is that an oil company may decide
to temporarily shut down the production when the oil price falls below the
extraction cost, whereas the same company may decide to start operation
as soon as the oil price rises above the extraction cost. This has happened
during the Gulf war when several oil fields in Texas and Southern California
began operations when the oil price went up sufficiently to cover the relatively
high extraction cost (Harvey 1999).
The strategic options like above are known as real options because the
real investment can be seen as coupled with a put or call option. Real options
research is one of the most fruitful fields in finance. Compared with the tradi-
tional “all-or-nothing” Net Present Value (NPV) approach, the real options
method takes the advantage of “wait-and-see” and react strategically when
uncertainty resolves over time. The investors can cut off unfavorable out-
comes by considering the possibilities like abandonment, deferment, switch-
ing. As a result, the real options approach can substantially increase the
value of a project, when compared with the less flexible NPV approach. The
standard Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) criteria often undervalue investment
opportunities (Dean 1951, Hayes & Abernathy 1980, Hayes & Garvin 1982),
which would lead to myopic decisions, underinvestment and eventual losses of
competitive positions because important strategic considerations are either
ignored or not properly valued.
Complicated methods have been developed to evaluate a variety of real
options. But in real life, people can still make different kinds of mistakes by
applying the model wrongly, or misunderstanding the real options nature of
a particular project.Therefore it is crucial to know whether the real options
approach makes intuitive sense to investors, and if not, what are the possible
pitfalls. For example, in the U.S. and other countries, the government reg-
ularly auctions off leases for offshore petroleum tracts of the land. The oil
companies have to bid hundreds of millions of dollars on such tracts, thus it
is important to perform valuations as accurate as possible. Given the mag-
nitude of the stakes in such investment, even a tiny valuation mistake may
cause large financial losses. But as observed by Dixit & Pindyck (1994), even
the government can arrive too low valuations, if they apply the NPV instead
of real options method.
Despite extensive theoretical work on real-option modeling, empirical
testing of real options has been still scarce. In particular, we know very
little about how people in the real world (e.g., managers) actually value real
4 1 INTRODUCTION
options more than at an anecdotal level. It is mainly due to the intrinsic dif-
ficulties to obtain reliable data on components of the real options approach,
such as the current and future value of an underlying asset, and the investors
expectations of the future cash flows, etc. Previous empirical studies of real
options often use either estimations or proxies for these input parameters
(e.g., Quigg, 1993). Such problems may be circumvented by using surveys or
well-controlled experiments.
In this paper, we report a laboratory experiment on real options decisions.
To our knowledge, this is the first exploratory study on the heterogeneity
of intuitive real options strategies in a continuous-time setting. We would
like to address the following questions: (1) Are our participants’ intuitive
strategies more consistent with NPV or real options strategies? (2) Are
there different types of investors in our dynamic investment setting? (3) Can
our participants identify the underlying price process and use it correctly for
their decisions? (4) What are the potential behavioral pitfalls in such real
options investment decisions?
Our participants were asked to imagine they are oil field managers. They
observed the oil price in a simulated market, and had to decide on production
technologies in each period. All changes of the production level incur switch-
ing costs. A real options strategy in this scenario would take into account the
flexibility of investment decisions and switch less often than a NPV strategy.
The advantage of using experimental methods is that we can control
the underlying price process and compute the optimal investment strategies
based on various theoretical assumptions. Then the behavior of the partic-
ipants can be compared with theoretical benchmarks, and we can identify
different groups based on their implicit strategies. Using cluster analysis, we
identified four typical strategies used by the participants, labeled as “Mean
reverting,” “Brownian motion real-option,” “Brownian motion myopic real-
option,” and “ambiguous.” The behavior of the first two groups was closest
to the rational real options strategy under different assumptions of price pro-
cesses (mean-reverting vs. Brownian motions). The last two groups played
less optimal strategies – the third group behaved myopically without con-
sidering the termination of the game, whereas the last group played NPV
strategy with a Geometric Brownian Motion process first, and converged to
a mean-reverting strategy towards the end.
Some theorists observed that the intuitive investment decisions by man-
agers are closer to real options strategies than the traditional NPV strategy
(Dixit & Pindyck 1994). Our results seem to support this observation, be-
cause the NPV strategy does not capture the behavior of most participants.
However, we find two typical behavioral biases from our participants. First,
many participants did not take into account the finite time horizon and switch
5too often at the end of the game, which reduced their earned profits. Sec-
ond, although many participants expected a mean-reverting price process,
they reacted to the price movement as if the price would follow a random
walk, leading to too frequent switches.
Despite certain behavioral biases, some participants demonstrate certain
kind of learning effect during the experiment. Two ways of learning are
possible. The first way of learning is to increasingly behave according to the
real options strategies over time. The second way of learning is to perceive
the true underlying mean-reverting process, and incorporate this process into
decision making. We found both types of learning among the participants.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: in the second section
we review the relevant literature on empirical and experimental option pricing
and real options studies. In the third section we outline the theoretical
framework behind our experimental design. The fourth section describes the
experiment procedure and the results. In the last section we discuss the
theoretical and practical implications of our study.
2 Literature Review
Before the formal introduction of the theoretical real options technique, many
corporate managers and strategists have dealt with the ideas of managerial
flexibility and strategic interactions on an intuitive basis. Myers (1977) first
proposed the idea of thinking of discretionary investment opportunities as
growth options. Kester (1984) discussed the strategic and competitive as-
pects of growth opportunities from a conceptual point of view. Other general
aspects of real options framework have been developed by Mason & Mer-
ton (1985), Trigeorgis & Mason (1987), Trigeorgis (1988), Brealey & Myers
(1991), Kulatilaka (1988) and Kulatilaka (1992). More specific applications
of the real options framework to various investment problems include real es-
tate development (Titman 1985, Williams 1991), lease contracts (Schallheim
& McConnell 1983, Grenadier 1995), oil exploration (Paddock, Siegel &
Smith 1988), and research and development (Dasgupta & Stiglitz 1980).
To our knowledge, there are relatively few experimental studies on option
pricing and real options. In general, it seems that subjects tend to be in-
consistent when they value options. For example, Shavit, Sonsino & Benzion
(2002) found that their subjects were risk-averse when assigning values to the
basic lotteries, but risk-seeking when bidding options on the same lotteries.
The bidding patterns also depends on the positions and initial endowments.
Arbitrage opportunities are often unexploited in experimental option mar-
kets (Abbink & Rockenbach 2006, OB´rien & Srivastava 1993, Shavit et al.
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2002). Behavioral theories such as mental accounting (Rockenbach 2002) and
Prospect Theory (Miller & Shapira 2004) have been proposed to explain the
inconsistent behavior regarding option valuations. However, the results by
Shavit et al. (2002) can not fully be reconciled with Expected Utility Theory
and Prospect Theory.
In particular, findings from previous experimental studies on real options
are somehow mixed regarding whether people’s intuition is consistent with
real options theory. For example, there is evidence that the subjects take
less irreversible investment now if they expect more information about the
risky asset arrive in the future (Rauchs & Willinger 1996). Howell & Ja¨gle
(1997) asked managers to make hypothetical decisions on investment case
studies in the context of growth options. In their setting, after a fixed period
of time, it is possible to invest in a follow-up project. Several factors in the
Black-Scholes model, such Present Value, volatility and time to maturity,
have been varied to investigate whether respondents could intuitively apply
real options approach. Although it seems that the respondents did not hold
the simplistic NPV view for valuation, neither were their decisions perfectly
in line with real options theory. Both under- and over-valuations occur. It is
also observed that factors like industry, sector, personal experience and posi-
tion have influences on valuations. Interestingly, more experienced managers
were more likely to overvalue the projects, probably due to overoptimism. In
general, the behavior of the respondents cannot be described by one model
due to the existence of heterogeneity.
Another notable experimental study is from Yavas & Sirmans (2005),
who applied a simple two-stage investment setting to test for optimal tim-
ing by the subjects. They also measured the premium associated with the
real options components of an investment and examined how this premium
is correlated with uncertainty about future cash flows from the investment.
Their results again provide mixed evidence regarding the descriptive valid-
ity of real options theory. On the one hand, most subjects seemed to be
too optimistic and entered the project too early when compared with the
theoretical optimal timing. On the other hand, in the bidding experiment,
their bids for the right to invest in a project were in general close to the
theoretical level, and reflected the value of the real options embedded in the
project. Moreover, the bidding behavior of the participants was consistent
with option pricing theory, which predicts that greater uncertainty about
future cash flows increases the value of the project.
An interesting phenomenon in the experiment by Yavas & Sirmans (2005)
is the learning effect. At the beginning, the bids were too optimistic and
hence too high, which is consistent with the typical observation that in-
experienced investors tend to be more aggressive and optimistic. The price,
7however, converged to the theoretical predictions as the experience increases.
There was also evidence that some subjects learned to postpone their invest-
ment decisions after they gained experience.
While the above studies are among the first empirical tests of option pric-
ing theory, their set-ups are relatively simple. Subjects typically only make
decisions over no more than three periods. Although simplified tasks help
to disentangle confounding factors, it is not clear whether one can generalize
the results to the more realistic context. This motivates us to start an ex-
periment on real option investment in a highly dynamic environment, which
is more complicated but also more realistic. Consistent with previous obser-
vations, we find real options strategies seem to be more intuitive than the
NPV approach, but people differs very much in their strategies. We can cat-
egorize the subjects into four typical types. The behavior of some groups is
consistent with some previous findings such as the learning effect and myopic
behavior.
3 Theoretical Model
As a starting point, we established the theoretical framework for an oil-
manager investment game, in which the players are supposed to choose be-
tween different oil-production technologies in a dynamic market setting in
order to maximize their profits. In our setting, it is assumed that the explo-
ration and development of the oil field have been finished, and the manager
only encounters the decisions during the extraction stage. We have designed
the exogenous underlying price process, and solved the optimal strategies as
well as the optimal timing accordingly.
3.1 NPV vs. Real Options
Since for each period, players can make production decisions as a response to
the current market price, the situation is comparable to a series of American
call-options that can be exercised any time before the terminal date. The
real-option approach can be applied in this scenario, which is different from
the traditional NPV approach in that it takes the advantage of waiting.
When using NPV as the criterion to evaluate the investment opportunity, one
should invest immediately as long as the project has a positive net present
value. In comparison, real options theory prescribes that it is sometimes
better to wait until the uncertainty about the future cash flows are resolved.
We calculated the optimal timing and the investment strategies for both
NPV and real options approach as our theoretical benchmarks, as explained
8 3 THEORETICAL MODEL
below.
3.2 Geometric Brownian motion Process
Geometric Brownian motion is among the most common continuous-time
stochastic processes to model prices. A stochastic process Pt is said to follow
a Geometric Brownian motion if it satisfies the following equation:
dPt = µPtdt+ σPtdWt (1)
where {Wt, t ≥ 0} is a Wiener process or Brownian motion, and the
constant parameter σ represents variance or volatility. In our setting, the
drift µ is equal to zero. The increments in P , i.e., ∆P/P , are normally dis-
tributed, which means that absolute changes in P , i.e., ∆P , are lognormally
distributed, which is why the process has the name “geometric.”
The following set defines the possible critical prices Scrit where it is rea-
sonable to change the technology (see Appendix A for the proof):{− αI
T−u +QoldCold −QnewCnew
Qold −Qnew
∣∣∣u ∈ [t, T ], α ≥ 1} (2)
where Q denotes the quantity of production (e.g., the number of produced
barrels of oil), and C denotes the cost per unit (e.g., cost per barrel). The
subscript old refers to the adopted technology at a given time period t. The
subscript new stands for all other possible technologies other than the status
quo. The numerator is a sum of two parts: the first part is the investment
cost I multiplied by a factor α and divided by the remaining time steps T−t,
in which T is the number of total periods and t is the current period; the
second part is the difference between the total production cost of the old
and new technology. The denominator is the difference of the quantity of
production from current technology and the alternative technology.
The real options strategy takes into account the uncertainty in the future
and reevaluate the investment cost. That is, the investment cost I is mul-
tiplied with the parameter α, which reflects to which extent to the investor
considers the future uncertainty. The larger the α, the longer the player waits
before switching. When α = 1, then it is equivalent to the NPV strategy.
When α > 1, it corresponds to a possible real options strategy.
Figure 1 suggests such boundary solutions for a Geometric Brownian mo-
tion process. It shows the fluctuating price process and the switching bound-
aries that symbolize the critical price Scrit, where it is rational to switch from
one production condition to another. The left panel indicates the solution
for the NPV strategy α = 1 and the right panel shows the boundaries for
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the optimal real options strategy with α = 30. Compared to the real op-
tions strategy, it is clear that the boundaries for the NPV strategy are much
narrower, triggering more frequent switches between production levels.
In our experimental setting, when assuming a Geometric Brownian pro-
cess, a player would change technologies 38 times according to the NPV
approach. It would cost $12300 for technology changes, which almost offset
the gross profit of $14071, resulting in only a net profit of $1771. In com-
parison, if an investor adopts the optimal real options strategy with α = 30,
which theoretically would lead to maximum profits, then one only needs to
change technologies 17 times. The net profit increases from $1771 to $4689,
due to the reduction of switching costs.
Figure 1: Switching boundaries for NPV strategy(α = 1, left panel) and a
real-option strategy (α = 30, right panel) with a Geometric Brownian Motion
price process
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Y.
Another characteristic of the boundaries for the NPV strategy is that
they are almost flat for the first ninety periods, and only spread at the very
end. This means players should stop switching around the last ten periods
because the switching costs are too high comparing to the limited expected
profits. In comparison, the boundaries for the real options strategy spread
out even earlier, implying that it is optimal to stop switching during the
second half of the game.
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3.3 Risk Aversion and Mean Reverting
We now look at the boundary solutions for the more realistic assumptions,
namely risk-averse attitude and mean-reverting process. Most real options
models assume investors are risk-neutral, but in reality most investors are
risk-averse. We can assume an exponential utility to capture the degree of
risk-aversion as follows:
u(x) = cecx (3)
where c is the risk-aversion coefficient. Figure 2 shows a typical expo-
nential utility function with c = −0.0002, which seems to fit the behavior of
some types of our participants, as we will show later.
Utility Function for c = -0.0002 
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Figure 2: Exponential utility function (c = −0.0002)
Moreover, although Geometric Brownian motion as described above is
frequently used to model economic and financial variables, such as interest
rates and security prices, one may argue that it is more likely that oil prices
in practice follow a mean-reverting price. As Lund (1993) points out, Geo-
metric Brownian motion is hardly an equilibrium price process. The reason
is that when the prices rise, there are incentives for existing firms to increase
productions and for new firms to enter the market. The natural consequences
are that the larger supply would slow down the price increase, and ultimately
cause prices to decline. The same logic applies for the case of price decrease.
Therefore, at the market level, mean-reverting process is a more plausible
process for oil prices, which has been supported by some empirical tests (see
e.g., Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1991)).
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In our experiment, a mean-reverting process is used to model the stochas-
tic behavior of the continuous-time oil prices. The oil price P at time t is:
Pt = P
D
t e
k(− Q
tot
t
Q
max,tot
h,t
+0.5)
(4)
The above pricing process has two components, a mean-reverting com-
ponent and an exponential one. The first component PDt follows a mean-
reverting, or Orstein-Uhlenbeck process with
dPDt = h(µ− PDt )dt+ σdWt (5)
where {Wt, t ≥ 0} is a Wiener process or Brownian motion, µ is the long-run
mean of PDt , h is the speed of adjustment, and σ models the volatility of the
process. In our experiment, µ = 61.5, h = 0.5, σ = 9.0, and k = 0.
The second component in Equation 4 – the exponential function – models
the supply side. The fraction in the exponent measures the production, which
is the ratio between the realized industry production (Qtott ) and the maximal
industry production if all firms had chosen the technology with the high
capacity (Qmax,tott ). The fraction has a co-domain of [0,1]. k is a constant
factor that determines the impact of the exponential on PDt . It is a proxy for
the market size of the managed oil fields relative to the total market size. The
higher the k, the bigger the impact of the supply on the price. When k = 0,
the oil price Pt is determined independent of the oil production decisions by
the market participants, which is the case in our experiment.
Appendix A provides the proof for the boundary solutions. Figure 3
shows the switching boundaries of NPV strategy (i.e., α = 1) for the mean-
reverting price process. The left panel shows the switching boundaries for
the whole 100 time periods, whereas the right panel shows the boundaries
for last 30 periods, so that one can see in more detail the boundaries towards
the end. The boundaries become narrower over time but spread at the very
end (the right panel). Indeed, with a mean reverting process there are less
incentives to change the technology because the process is expected to revert
to its equilibrium level and the expected profit generated by a change of
technology could be negative. However, as time goes by, if the price becomes
much higher than the equilibrium level and if the speed of adjustment is
not too strong, the realized profit could be substantial because at maturity
the price is expected to be high. Finally, when it is close to maturity, the
sunk cost generated by a switch of technology is not compensated by possible
profit. The boundaries spread at the very end because then it does not make
sense to change the technology. In general, technology B (low production
level) is the most profitable strategy, even for NPV strategy (α = 1). This
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Figure 3: Switching boundaries for NPV strategy with a mean-reverting
price process (Left panel: all 100 time steps; Right panel: step 70 to 100)
c=-0.0002
Switching Boundaries for a Mean 
Reverting Model, α=1
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Time Step
Pr
ic
e 
Le
ve
l
Price
A -> B
B -> A
B -> 0
0 -> B
0 -> A
A -> 0
Switching Boundaries for a Mean 
Reverting Model, α=1
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
70 80 90
Time Step
Pr
ic
e 
Le
ve
l
Price
A -> B
B -> A
B -> 0
0 -> B
0 -> A
A -> 0
Notes: The left panel shows the boundary solutions the whole session (period 1 ∼ 100).
The right panel shows the boundary solutions from period 70 to 100, so one can see in
more detail the solutions towards the end of the experiment. “A” denotes technology A,
the technology with high production level and high cost; “B” denotes technology B, the
technology with low production level and low cost; “0” denotes no production. “X → Y”
denotes switching from production X to production Y.
is why in our setting one should never change the production technologies if
she assumes a mean-reverting process, regardless of whether she adopts NPV
or real options strategy.
3.4 Brownian Motion (BM)
When the speed of adjustment h is equal to 0 in Equation 5, the process
is consistent with a Brownian motion process. It can be considered as a
continuous-time version of a random walk. It has the Markov property in that
the past pattern of prices has no forecasting value, often referred to as “the
weak form of market efficiency.” It is based on the theoretical assumption
that all public information is quickly incorporated in the current price and
hence no investors could “beat the market.”
Compared with the mean-reverting processes, the decision rules for Brow-
nian motions are more explicit and intuitive. In principle, investors should
start or increase production when the price rises above some threshold, and
stop or reduce production when the price falls sufficiently. Figure 4 shows
the boundaries for NPV and a real options strategy when c = −0.0002 in the
exponential utility function (Equation 3). See Appendix A for the proof.
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Figure 4: Switching boundaries for real-option strategy with a Brownian price
process and risk-aversion attitudes (c=-0.0002) (Left panel: NPV α = 1;
Right panel: Real Option α = 30)
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4 Experiment
4.1 Participants and Procedure
In total 71 undergraduate students from the University of Zurich in Switzer-
land have participated the computerized experiment in June 2007. Our sub-
ject pool is relatively homogenous: They were recruited from classes in eco-
nomics or finance. The majority was male students (only 7 participants were
females). The average age was 24.4 years old (SD.=1.7). The data of five
participants were removed due to invalid answers, resulting in 66 participants
for the final analysis.
Figure 5 presents a screenshot of the experiment with illustrations, which
is also included in the instruction sheet for each participant (see Appendix
B for the text in the instruction sheet). In the experiment, participants were
asked to play the role of an oil-field manager and run the oil field to maximize
profits. For this purpose, they had to produce and sell oil in a simulated
market. The oil price was generated from a mean-reverting Markov process,
specified in Equation 4 and Equation 5 in the section of theoretical models.
The price process is exogenous and the players are price takers, because we
are mainly interested in investors’ strategies but not the market equilibrium.
The participants were not told the underlying price process, and all of them
were confronted with the same price process.
The experimental session lasted 100 periods. Each period represents one
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business day and is divided into 10 sub-steps in order to approximate the
daily dynamics generated by a stochastic process (e.g., Geometric Brownian
motion or mean reverting). For simplicity, the oil cannot be reserved for
the following periods, and all produced oil are automatically sold at the end
of each period, and the players were asked to choose from two production
technologies for the next period: (1) Technology A has a higher production
level (50 barrels per day) and higher cost ($611 per barrel); (2) Technology
B has a lower production level (25 barrels per day) and lower cost ($58 per
barrel). Alternatively, a player could also choose to disinvest or shut down the
production, resulting in zero production level. To switch between different
technologies, or switching from zero level to a new technology costs $350 each
time, whereas switching between existing technology and disinvestment costs
$300 each time.
In addition to the production decisions, we also elicited participants’ ex-
pectations of the price movement for each coming period. At the beginning of
each period, before the participants see the price development of the coming
period, they were asked to choose from three possible movements of the oil
price: (1) the price will increase by more than $1 from the previous period;
(2) the price will decrease by more than $1; (3) the price will stay more or less
the same (i.e., less than $1 change. The predictions were not incentivized.
Each participant was given 3000 experimental dollars as initial endow-
ment (one experimental dollar = 0.005 CHF). Since the oil produced in each
period is automatically sold at the current market price, the profit from each
period is determined by (oil price − production cost) × (number of barrels)
−(switching cost). The final profit is determined by the sum of the profit
from all 100 periods. At the end of the experiment, the participants were
paid out by cash based on their final profit which was converted to Swiss
Francs (CHF). The whole experiment took about one hour, including an in-
troduction session, an experimental session, and a questionnaire session. The
average earning of the participants was 33.5 CHF (SD=12.9 CHF).
The simulation also generated news messages of various events. There
are two types of messages: relevant vs. irrelevant. The relevant messages
make explicit predictions about the incoming oil price movement (i.e., in-
crease/decrease/stay the same) based on certain events (e.g., workers in oil
industry went on strike so that the oil price is expected to rise.), whereas the
irrelevant messages report certain events unrelated to the oil market and have
no obvious implication to short-term oil price fluctuations (e.g., the CEO of
Apple announces plan for new Apple products). There are three treatments
regarding incoming news messages: (1) Filtered information: participants
1The symbol $ here represents experimental currency.
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Figure 5: Screen shot in the instruction manual (the call-out boxes are trans-
lated into English from the original German texts )
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only received relevant messages during 46 periods out of 100 periods; (2)
All information: participants received a mixture of relevant and irrelevant
messages during 70 periods out of 100 periods(with 46 periods of relevant
messages and 24 periods of irrelevant messages); (3) No information: partic-
ipants received no news messages during the whole experiment. We present
the treatment effect in the following section.
4.2 Treatment effect
The purpose of the information treatment is to investigate (1) whether more
information about price movement can improve the performance; (2) whether
irrelevant information has negative impacts on performance. Table 1 shows
the information treatment effects. The last column indicates that the group
without information was indeed at disadvantage when they predicted the
price movement in the next period: only around 32% of the time they pre-
dicted correctly the next period price movement, whereas the groups with
information were more likely to predict correctly the price movement for
the next period. The groups with information also performed better and
made more profits. However, opposite to our expectation, the group with
filtered information were slightly worse in prediction and performance when
compared with the group with mixed information. It seems that irrelevant
information did not hurt the performance. Moreover, the group with all in-
formation switched technologies less frequently than the other two groups.
It is also interesting to see that although the group with filtered information
switched approximately with same frequency as the group with no informa-
tion, they performed significantly better, which implies that the group with
filtered information were more efficient with their decisions.
Table 1: Switching frequencies, average profits and prediction hit ratios by
each information treatment
Switching Frequencies Mean Profits ($) Prediction hit ratio
Group N Mean(SD) Mean(SD)
All information 19 13.5 (7.4) 5439(2621) 70.6 (24.3)
Filtered information 16 17.3 (11.0) 4846(2870) 61.6 (26.9)
No information 31 19.2 (7.0) 3583 (2677) 31.7 (14.1)
Note: ANOVA test shows marginally significant between-treatment differences on switch-
ing frequencies (F(2,63)=3.02, p=0.05) and mean profits (F(2,63)=2.79, p=0.06). Predic-
tion hit ratio is defined by the proportion of correct prediction of oil price movement on
the next period. We only calculated those periods with relevant messages. Paired t-tests
indicate significant differences between treatments (p<0.01 for all pair-wise comparisons).
4.3 Classification of participants based on strategies 17
4.3 Classification of participants based on strategies
In order to classify participants based on their switching decisions, we run a
two-step cluster analysis for all participants with all 100 periods. A two-step
cluster method is a scalable cluster analysis algorithm to handle very large
data sets. Unlike the K-means or hierarchical clustering, the two-step cluster
method can handle both continuous and categorical variables. In our case,
since the decision variables are categorical variables, the two-step cluster
method is the only appropriate method. The log-likelihood distance measure
and BIC criterion were used to detect the optimal number of clusters. The
cluster analysis revealed four homogenous subgroups, which can be compared
with candidate theoretical strategies.
Now let us look at the matching rate with the candidate strategies for
each subgroup in Table 2. Each column represents one of the six potential
strategies that have been discussed in the theoretical section, while each row
represents one of the four types of investor from the cluster analysis. We
compare the modal behavior of each cluster with the theoretical strategies.
The matching rate is defined as the percentage of decisions that coincide with
the theoretical strategies for the whole 100 periods. It seems that the first
group matches very well (matching rate=0.94) with a NPV or real-option
strategy when assuming a mean-reverting process.2 We label this group
as “mean-reverting.” The second group matches best with the optimal real
options strategy under Brownian motion process with risk-averse attitude
(matching rate=0.87). Thus they are labeled as “Brownian motion real-
option.” The third group, labeled as “Brownian motion myopic real-option,”
fits best with a myopic real-option strategy with risk averse attitude. The
last group is most similar with NPV strategy with a Geometric Brownian
motion process. However, later we will see that the last group behaved as if
they changed the perceived price process from Geometric Brownian motion
to Mean-reverting process. So it seems that this group did not follow a
consistent strategy. Accordingly, we label them as “ambiguous .”
Figure 6 shows the majority behavior for each classified group as com-
pared with the predicted decisions of the corresponding theoretical strategies.
In the following we explain in more details these four strategies.
Group 1: “Mean-reverting” strategy. The left panel of the first row in
Figure 6 shows the majority behavior of this group. Only nine out of our 66
participants belong to this cluster. Most of the time, technology B (low pro-
duction technology) was chosen, which coincides with the theoretical NPV or
2Note that when assuming the mean-reverting process, both NPV and real options
strategies would prescribe no changes and staying in Technology B. See discussion in the
theoretical section.
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Table 2: Matching rates for each group with different strategies
Risk-averse attitude
N Geo. Brownian Mean-revert. Brownian motion
Group NPV RO RO/NPV NPV RO RO myopic
1. Mean-revert. 9 0.47 0.08 0.94 0.26 0.08 0.08
2. BM Risk-averse RO 12 0.39 0.71 0.08 0.53 0.87 0.73
3. BM Myopic RO 29 0.46 0.73 0.07 0.55 0.67 0.75
4. Ambiguous 16 0.58 0.49 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.50
Note: RO means Real Options and NPV means Net Present Value. Each row
represents one of the four classified groups. Each column represents the potential
strategies. Matching rate is the percentage of decisions that coincide with the theoretical
strategies for the whole 100 periods for each group. For example, in the first row,
0.86 means that on average there are 86 periods out of 100 periods in which the
decisions by participants in the mean-reverting group coincide with the theoretical
predictions of NPV/Real options strategy for the mean-reverting price process.The bold
fonts represent the highest matching rate among all theoretical strategies for a given group.
real options strategies when assuming the mean-reverting process (the right
panel of the first row in Figure 6). One should avoid switching technolo-
gies under the mean-reverting process because the price will bounce back
and it would not pay off to react to the short-run market price fluctuations.
“Wait-and-see has the highest value in this case.
Group 2: “Brownian motion real-option” strategy. Twelve out of 66 par-
ticipants are classified into this group (the second row in Figure 6). The main
characteristic of their strategy is that they switched to the high-production
technology when the oil price was sufficiently high, and shut down the pro-
duction when the price was too low. When the game approached to the end,
however, it was not worth to switch any more because the potential profit
was limited. So the investors stayed at the high production level during
the second half of the experiment. This behavioral pattern corresponds to a
real-option strategy (α = 30) under the assumption of Brownian motion price
process and risk-aversion exponential utility function with the risk coefficient
c=-0.0002 (see the right panel in the second row).
Group 3: “Myopic Brownian motion real-option” strategy. This is the
biggest group from our cluster analysis, which contains nearly half of the
participants (29 out of 66). As we can see from the left panel of the third
row in Figure 6, the participants basically followed the market price, i.e.,
switched to the high production when the price went up, and shut down the
production when the price fell, which is very similar to the second group
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(real options with Brownian motion). The main difference is that the second
group stopped switching during the second half of the game, whereas the
third group still kept changing technologies, which is not optimal due to the
high switching costs. This group played as if they ignored the finite horizon
of the game and believed that the game would last for ever without a limit
of potential profits. In this case, the theoretical switching boundaries are
not sensitive to the termination date and keep flat until the last period.
Therefore we call it a “myopic real-option” strategy assuming a Brownian
motion process.
Group 4: “Ambiguous” strategy. The strategies adopted by the rest 16
participants are rather ambiguous (the last row in Figure 6). During the
first 70 periods of the game, their decisions resemble a NPV strategy with
an underlying Geometric Brownian Motion process – they switched to the
high-production technology when the price is very high, reduced to the low
production when the price is relatively low, and shut down when the price is
very low. The changing frequency is substantially higher than the first three
group. In the last 20∼30 periods, the low production technology has been
chosen and virtually no more switches occur, which is similar to a Mean-
reverting strategy (Group 1). We label this group as “ambiguous”, because
participants did not play consistently with one strategy. In contrast, they
seemed to learn the underlying price process and changed their strategies over
time. We will discuss this again in the next section about learning effect.
Table 3 shows the switching frequencies and average profits by each group
with different strategies. It also shows the treatment effect within each group.
We find that within the “Brownian motion myopic real-option” group, partic-
ipants under either filtered or all information conditions perform better than
those with no information (p<.05). Similar effect can be observed within the
group who adopts the “Brownian motion real-option” strategy, although less
significantly so (p=.06). Both groups suggest that participants seem to ben-
efit from the information about price movements. It seems that the groups
with “mean-reverting” and “ambiguous” strategies did not benefit from the
information about price movements.
4.4 Learning
In the above we analyzed the matching rates for the whole experiment for
all 100 periods. But it may happen that the participants learned to play
more optimally over time. We divided the 100 periods into three windows
– periods 1-33, 34-67, and 68-100. Figure 7 shows that in some cases the
matching rates indeed change dramatically over time. The decisions by the
second group match the “Brownian motion real option” strategy from around
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Figure 6: Four groups from cluster analysis
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Note: The upper curve in each graph indicates the price process in the experiment. The
two curves at the bottom in each graph indicate the observed majority production decisions
in each cluster and the corresponding theoretical decisions, respectively. On the right side
of the lowest curve, the assumptions and characteristics of each theoretical strategy are
described. “A” represent high production level; “B” represents low production level.
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Table 3: Switching frequencies and average profits by each group and infor-
mation treatment
Switching Frequencies Mean Profit ($)
Theoretical In experiment Theoretical In experiment
Group N prediction Mean(SD) prediction Mean(SD)
Mean reverting 9 0 9 (6.6) 9979 7756 (1909)
Filtered information 2 14 (5.7) 6081 (1807)
All information 4 6 (5.3) 8857 (978)
No information 3 10 (8) 7406 (2469)
ANOVA test F(2,6)=1.26, p=.35 F(2,6)=1.77, p=.25
Brownian motion RO 12 10 10 (6.0) 5982 4750 (2383)
Filtered information 4 7 (3.8) 6401 (1040)
All information 5 10 (6.2) 4908 (1955)
No information 3 14 (7.0) 2284 (2706)
ANOVA test F(2,9)=1.60, p=.25 F(2,9)=3.97, p=.06
Brownian motion myopic RO 29 22 21 (5.3) 2555 3924 (2390)
Filtered information 6 21 (5.5) 5465 (2593)
All information 8 17 (4.0) 5047 (1872)
No information 15 23 (4.9) 2708 (1988)
ANOVA test F(2,26)=4.36, p<.05 F(2,26)=5.33, p<.05
Ambiguous 16 37 20 (9.6) 2311 3211 (2863)
Filtered information 4 23 (16.9) 1747 (3165)
All information 2 25 (1.4) 1504 (793)
No information 10 18 (6.6) 4138 (2775)
ANOVA test F(2,13)=.75, p=.50 F(2,13)=1.50, p=.26
Note: ANOVA test shows significant between-cluster differences on switching frequencies
(F(3,62)=12.40, p<0.01) and mean profits (F(3,62)=7.28, p<0.01). The switching frequen-
cies and mean profits of each information treatment subgroup are presented. ANOVA test
shows no significant treatment effect except for “Brownian motion myopic real option”
cluster.
80% for the first 33 periods, and the matching rate increases to around 95%
for the last 33 periods. We may say that this group seemed to learn to play
optimal strategies as time went on.
The group with “ambiguous” strategy matches best with the real options
strategy with Brownian motion or Geometric Brownian motion. However,
in the last period, the matching rate with those strategies drops sharply,
and there is a dramatic increase of matching rate with the strategies with
mean-reverting process. They behaved as if they had identified the true
underlying process, and incorporated this information in their decisions later
in the game.
The biggest group, “Brownian motion myopic real-option” group, coin-
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cides best with the myopic real option strategy, without big differences across
three time windows. This group switched between technologies until the end
of the game, which is non-optimal.
4.5 Expectations and decisions
Although the true underlying price process in our experiment was a mean-
reverting process, the participants may have different perceptions. During
the experiment, for each period we asked participants about their expecta-
tions of the price movement in the next period, which allows us to check the
expected price process. In the following, we discuss the impact of current
prices on expected future prices and production decisions.3
Figure 8 compares the price prediction vs. past period prices for all four
groups. It is interesting to see that all four groups perceived some kind
of mean-reverting underlying price process– when the price in the previous
period is high (low), they expected the price to go down (up) in the next
period. For the middle-range prices, they expected little change in the next
period.4
Figure 9 shows that in general, for the high prices, they tended to use high
production technology; for the medium prices, they tended to use low produc-
tion technology. When the prices were sufficiently low, they tended to have
no production. This is puzzling because according to our comparisons with
the theoretical strategies, most participants behaved “as if” they believed in
a Brownian motion price process, but they seem to perceive a mean-reverting
process based on our elicitation of their expectations. In other words, they
somehow expected the future price will revert to the average price, but they
did not incorporate this information into their decisions. Further analysis on
the relation between prices and switching decisions indicates that the deci-
sions to switch to higher production levels tend to occur when the prices were
relatively high (Mean=63.0, SD=7.4, N=621), whereas decisions to reduce
production levels tend to occur when prices were relatively low (Mean=58.8,
SD=7.9, N=573). This implies that some participants switched production
3We have conducted regression analysis to see whether the current performance affect
decisions. We find that the decisions are very sensitive to the current price but not to
current wealth level or performance. It seems that in our settings, participants paid more
attention to the price fluctuation than the recent performance. Therefore we couldn’t
observe strong recency effects based on recent experience and payoffs as suggested from
the previous literature (Denrell 2007, Erev, Ert, Roth, Haruvy, Herzog, Hau, Herwig,
Steward, West & Lebier 2010, Ert & Erev 2007, Marchiori & Warglien 2008, Odean 1999).
4Such central tendency of judgment has also been reported in the classic literature by
Hollingworth (1910) and Helson (1964).
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Figure 7: Matching strategies over time for four groups
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technologies as an immediate response to the market price fluctuation with-
out considering the switching cost. Their production decisions were more
in a trend-following style, which is opposite to their mean-reverting belief.
It contradicts the normative point of view, because if investors believed the
price will revert to some mean price, they should have waited longer for price
to bounce back and should not change the technologies so quickly, since po-
tential profits would be too low to compensate the switching costs.
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Figure 8: Price prediction vs. past price for all four groups
Note: The x-axis shows the prediction of price movement for the coming period t+ 1 and
the y-axis shows the 95% Confidence Interval (CI) of the price in the current period t.
4.6 Information, price perception, and strategies
Figure 10 shows the range of past period price as compared to price predic-
tion for different information conditions. As we expected, the group with
no information perceive the price process to be close to a Brownian motion
process, whereas the groups with filtered information and unfiltered informa-
tion perceive the price to be closer to the true price process (mean-reverting
process).
Figure 11 shows that the subjects with information were more likely to
choose the more profitable strategies, and belong to the “more rational”
groups (“mean reverting” and “Brownian motion real-option”), whereas the
subjects without information were more likely to be classified into the “less
rational” groups (“Brownian motion myopic real-option” and “ambiguous”),
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Note:The x-axis shows the decisions for production level for the coming period t + 1 and
the y-axis shows the 95% Confidence Interval (CI) of the price in the current period t.
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Figure 10: Price predictions vs. past period price across different information
conditions
Note: The x-axis shows the prediction of price movement for the coming period t+ 1 and
the y-axis shows the 95% Confidence Interval (CI) of the price in current period t.
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who followed less optimal strategies. However, the differences are only signif-
icant for the “Brownian motion real-option” group (p=0.004) and marginally
significant for the “ambiguous group” (p=0.07). The lack of statistical power
can be caused by the small sample size. Further studies are needed to inves-
tigate the mechanisms under which the strategies are influenced by available
information.
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Figure 11: Group classification within information conditions
Note:
1. The difference between the full information and the filtered information conditions
are not significant. The t-test results for each cluster are: Mean reversion (t=0.685,
p=0.25), Real option (t=0.089, p=0.54), Myopic real option (t=0.278, p=0.39),Ambiguous
(t=1.121, p=0.14). Therefore we pool these two group and label it as ”with information.”
2. The t-tests results between the groups with and without information are: Mean re-
version (t=0.900, p=0.81), Real option (t=1.763, p=0.004), Myopic real option (t=0.687,
p=0.25), Ambiguous (t=1.434, p=0.07).
5 Conclusion
This paper reports a laboratory experiment to test how people intuitively
handle option-like investment. It can be seen as an extension of previous
experimental studies on real options in the literature, e.g., Yavas & Sir-
mans (2005), Miller & Shapira (2004) and Howell & Ja¨gle (1997). We use
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continuous-time setting which is closer to decisions in the real world. Al-
though we did not recruit real managers for our tasks, our student subjects
were mostly with economic or finance backgrounds, and were very interested
in such management tasks. In a questionnaire at the end of the experiment,
most participants indicated that they found the experiment interesting, and
they also indicated that maximizing payoffs is one of their main goals. There-
fore, we believe the students were well motivated.
Although many people may believe managers and professionals are ratio-
nal and can perform better than students and laymen, numerous empirical
studies show that professionals also prone to various kinds of behavioral
biases, e.g., Cadsby & Maynes (1998), Gort, Wang & Siegrist (2008). It
was also found in laboratory experiments that professional traders even per-
formed worse than university students in the option pricing tasks (Abbink
& Rockenbach 2006), and CEOs behaved similarly to undergraduates in the
bubble experiments (Ackert & Church 2001), etc. In general, the literature
on experimental economics and finance suggests no significant differences be-
tween university students and professionals in such stylized experiments (Ball
& Cech 1996, Banks, Camerer & Porter 1994, King, Smith, Williams & van
Boening 1992, Siegel & Harnett 1964). The behavioral biases found in our
experiment, therefore, may not be unique only for undergraduate samples.
The experimental and empirical studies are complementary in the sense that
the observed behavior from well-controlled experiments offers us guidance
regarding what kinds of behavioral biases we should look for when studying
real-world decisions. The further step is to compare the behavioral patterns
revealed in our experiment with the real-options investment behavior by pro-
fessionals, and to study the implications of such biases on option pricing at
the aggregate level through theoretical modeling.
Different types of investment behavior among players were identified us-
ing cluster analysis. We found some participants behaved close to optimal
real options strategies, whereas others exhibited certain typical behavior bi-
ases. This is consistent with the general findings on ”typing” heterogeneous
behavior in dynamic decision problems, such as Bayesian learning (El-Gamal
& Grether 1995) and stochastic sequential discrete choice (Houser, Keane &
McCab 2004). Our results can shed lights on understanding the different
types of intuitive strategies when it comes to real options investment.
The first behavioral bias we noticed is the ignorance of mean-reverting
process. Most participants seemed to believe in a mean-reverting price pro-
cess. However, many of them did not incorporate this expectation into their
decisions, and hence switched technologies by following the market price as
if they believed in a Brownian motion process. Although it is extremely dif-
ficult to determine the true process in reality, ignoring mean-reversion may
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undervalue the value of a project (Dixit & Pindyck 1994). In particular, not
being able incorporating the expected price process into decision making like
our participants, may be a more general behavioral bias that deserves further
investigation.
Another bias we found is the insensitivity to the termination date. Nearly
half of our participants played as if the game would last for ever. They kept
switching technologies till the end of the experiment, a strategy that would
not pay off due to the high switching cost and low limited expected profits.
However, some participants seemed to learn over time. In the future, it is
important to investigate under which conditions investors can learn faster,
and how they learn.
In general, it seems that the real options approach with a Brownian mo-
tion process make more intuitive sense to most participants than the NPV
approach, even though they inclined to certain kinds of biases like described
above. It is important to document the heterogeneity and understand which
factors can cause such different behavior, an under-explored topic. In our ex-
periment, the participants were not told the underlying price process. Instead
we provided some participants with news messages that predict the future
price movements, and other participants without such messages. We also
elicited their own predictions at the end of each period. However, these are
rather indirect measures which potentially add unnecessary noise. In the fu-
ture experiments, the design can be improved by instructing the participants
about the precise underlying price processes, e.g., mean-reverting process vs.
Brownian-motion process, and compare the differences, e.g., whether people
adjust their strategies based on different underlying processes .5
In our experiment, the investors made decisions at the individual level
without interactions to other players. But in reality the optimal strategies
also depend on the market environment, e.g., the degree of competition – the
advantage of waiting may be reduced when competition is intense. Moreover,
the possibilities of alliance can also influence the optimal strategies. One pos-
sible extension to the experimental setting is to introduce such interactions
between players (for a review on games and real options, see Smit & Tri-
georgis (2006)). Such interactive setting would help us to gain insights not
only on individual decisions on real options investment under alliance and
competition, but also on the evolution process of market equilibriums.
We hope our study takes one further step in developing a descriptive real
options theory, and we encourage more in-depth empirical and experimen-
tal research on real options to understand how managers learn, how they
integrate information, and how they react to competition and alliance.
5We thank an anonymous referee for this point.
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A Proof of Boundary Conditions
A.1 Geometric Brownian Motion
In the case of Geometric Brownian Motion, the dynamics of oil prices are
given by:
dPu
Pu
= σdWu
where the constant parameter σ represents the volatility. In this setting, the
drift is equal to zero. The discount rate is the constant parameter r.
A.1.1 NPV approach
The expectation of the discounted profit Πt corresponding to a switch of
technology at time t (from the old one to a new one) is:
EP(Πt|Ft) = (EP
[ ∫ T
t
Pue
−r(u−t)du
∣∣∣Ft]− Cnew(T − t))Qnew − I
where I represents the switching cost, from the old to the new technology, i.e.
EP(Πt|Ft) = (EP
[
Pt
∫ T
t
e−r(u−t)e−
−σ2
2
(u−t)+σ(Wu−Wt)du
∣∣∣Ft]−Cnew(T−t))Qnew−I
The experiment lasts only a few hours, therefore we assume that the interest
rate r is equal to zero. In order to approximate the exercise boundary, we
assume that the new technology will be kept up until maturity T.
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P represents the historical probability. The following result is obtained:
EP(Πt|Ft) = Qnew(T − t)(Pt − Cnew)− I
In order to obtain the critical price P ∗, the expected discounted profit, in the
case of technology change, has to be compared with the expected discounted
profit if the firm keeps the old technology. This critical price satisfies there-
fore the following equation:
Qnew(T − t)(P ∗t − Cnew)− I = Qold(T − t)(P ∗t − Cold)
and expression 2 is obtained, with α = 1. This case corresponds to the NPV
approach.
A.1.2 The real options approach
In this setting, the players will wait longer before switching. Therefore we
obtain a set of possible exercise boundaries:
{− αI
T−u +QoldCold −QnewCnew
Qold −Qnew
∣∣∣u ∈ [t, T ], α ≥ 1}
which corresponds to expression 2. In order to derive the optimal parameter
α∗, we rely on a Monte-Carlo simulation. The price process is simulated n
times and we look for α which maximizes the average realized profit.
A.2 The mean reverting process
In this case, we focus on an Orstein-Uhlenbeck process. The dynamics of oil
prices are therefore given by:
dPt = h(µ− Pt)dt+ σdWt
We work with the following utility function:
U(x) = cecx
where c is a negative parameter.
The expected utility of the profit Πt corresponding to a switch of technology
at time t is:
EP(U(Πt)|Ft)
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where
Πt = Qnew
(∫ T
t
Pudu− Cnew(T − t)
)
− I
Therefore:
EP(U(Πt)|Ft) = EP(ecQnew
R T
t Pudu|Ft)× e−cCnewQnew(T−t) × e−cI
= ecQnewM(t,T )+
c2
2
Q2newV (t,T ) × e−cCnewQnew(T−t) × e−cI
with:
M(t, T ) = µ(T − t) + (Pt − µ)(1− e
−h(T−t)
h
)
V (t, T ) = − σ
2
2h3
(1− e−h(T−t))2 + σ
2
h2
(T − t− 1− e
−h(T−t)
h
)
Indeed,
∫ T
t
Pudu is a normally distributed random variable with meanM(t, T )
and variance V (t, T ).
In order to obtain the exercise boundary, the expected utility of the profit
with the new and the old technology, have to be compared. P ∗t is the solution
of the following equation:
ecQnewM(t,T )+
c2
2
Q2newV (t,T )e−cCnewQnew(T−t)−cI =
= ecQoldM(t,T )+
c2
2
Q2oldV (t,T )e−cColdQold(T−t)
i.e.
(Qold−Qnew)M(t, T ) = − c
2
(Q2old−Q2new)V (t, T )+(T−t)(QoldCold−QnewCnew)−I
(Qold −Qnew)(Pt − µ)(1− e
−h(T−t)
h
) = − c
2
(Q2old −Q2new)V (t, T )−
− I + (T − t)(QoldCold −QnewCnew)−
− (Qold −Qnew)µ(T − t)
i.e.
P ∗t =µ+
h
1− e−h(T−t)
[
− c
2
(Q2old −Q2new)V (t, T )− I+
+ (QoldCold −QnewCnew)(T − t)− (Qold −Qnew)µ(T − t)
]/
(Qold −Qnew)
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In the real options setting, there is a set of possible exercise boundaries:{
µ+
h
1− e−h(T−t)
[
− c
2
(Q2old −Q2new)V (t, T )− αI+
+ (QoldCold −QnewCnew)(T − t)− (Qold −Qnew)µ(T − t)
]/
(Qold −Qnew), u ∈ [t, T ], α ≥ 1
}
The exercise boundary corresponds to the value of α which maximizes the
average realized profit. The NPV case is obtained for α = 1.
A.3 The Brownian motion
In this case the dynamics of the underlying are given by:
dPt = σdWt
The exercize boundary is obtained by letting h going to zero in the last
equation.
By relying on a Taylor expansion, we obtain the following set of possible
exercise boundaries:{
(QoldCold −QnewCnew)− αIT−u − c3(Q2old −Q2new)σ2(T − t)2
Qold −Qnew
∣∣∣u ∈ [t, T ], α ≥ 1}
B Instruction sheet of the Experiment
Introduction
• This experiment investigates human behaviour under uncertainty. The
participants are rewarded according to their achievements.
• During the experiment, it is not allowed to communicate with other
participants or to look at their screens.
• The experiment is to be processed to the full extent.
• If the participant does not follow the above rules, he or she will be
excluded from the experiment without getting paid
The structure of the experiment
• You play the role of the oil company manager and choose the technology
which allows you to extract a certain quantity of oil and later sell it on
the market.
33
• Each time period in the experiment corresponds to a day on the oil
market. Overall, the experiment lasts for 100 days.
• Every day you observe the price on the oil market. In the evening, after
the market is closed, you will be first asked about your expectations on
the tomorrow. Only then you can decide on your production setup for
the next day.
• You begin with the starting capital of 3000$. If you go bankrupt, you
will be fired and the experiment is finished for you. The higher wealth
you achieved, the more you get paid.
• You can choose between 2 technologies with following parameters:
Name Costs per barrel Production
per day
Technology A 61 Dollar 50 Barrel
Technology B 58 Dollar 25 Barrel
• Every technology change causes the switching costs. A technology
change costs 350$, a production stop costs 300$. If you start pro-
ducing again with the same technology, you need to pay 300$, if you
change technology after the stop, you need to pay 350$ for it.
Switching costs from A to B or from B
to A
350$
Switching costs from A to Stop or from
B to Stop
300$
Switching costs from Stop to the tech-
nology used before the Stop (Ex.: A -
Stop - A)
300$
Switching costs from Stop to the tech-
nology different as one used before the
Stop (Ex.: A - Stop - B)
350$
• The extracted oil is sold in the evening the same day at the current
price of the world market. Warning: there is no link here between
reality and the experiment.
• During the game, you receive information on market trends which you
need to work out.
Handling
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• At the beginning, in the first 2 introductory time periods, it will be
shown the information possibilities and how to run the software.
• On the next page you will find a screenshot with the statements on the
relevant parts.
Examples of the performance calculation
1. A player produces at the beginning of the game with technology A.
After two periods he decides to stop the production. At the end of two
periods, the price of oil is 56.4 $ and 62.8 $ respectively. The profit is
calculated as follows:
(56.4 $/Barrel - 61 $/Barrel) * 50 Barrel - 0 $ = -230 $
(62.8 $/Barrel - 61 $/Barrel) * 50 Barrel - 0 $ = 90 $
2. Then the player chooses to switch to technology B. With an oil price
of 66.4 $ she earns at the 3-rd time period:
(66.4 $/Barrel - 58 $/Barrel) * 25 Barrel - 300 $ = -90 $
Initial wealth and pay-off calculation
• You take on the oil field with the following settings: Wealth: 3000$,
current technology: B.
• The pay-off depends on the performance. The more dollars you have
earned, the more money you get. Your profit will be calculated as
follows:
Total profit = Σ profits Pt of all time periods;
Profit of a time period Pt = (Oil price - Production costs) *Number
of produced barrels - Switching costs.
• You get a base salary of 10 CHF for the participation in the experi-
ment. For every extra dollar that you earn, you get 0,5 Rappen (i.e.
1$=0,005CHF). In case of loss, you don’t have to pay anything back.
• The paid amount is rounded by 2 CHF
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